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Abstract 
While a considerable amount of research has already been carried out into the 
corporate governance determinants of non-financial risk disclosure in companies in 
the private sector, such determinants in the annual reports of listed Government-
owned Companies (LGCs) have yet to be investigated fully. This study attempts to 
complete the picture. Italian LGCs have been selected for analysis and agency the-
ory has been applied in the public sector under the accountability paradigm. The 
research investigates whether non-financial risk disclosure provided in the Man-
agement Commentary (MC) of Italian LGCs may be affected by ownership con-
centration, corporate governance mechanisms and company-specific features. The 
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issue is of particular importance in a country where Government intervention has 
significantly affected its economic development since the nineteenth century. Our 
findings show that there is a relationship between the level of non-financial risk 
disclosure and Board diversity, leverage and sector. Our findings also reveal some 
useful insights concerning policy makers and standard setters. 
Keywords: government-owned companies; accountability; non-financial risk dis-
closure;, corporate governance. 
First submission: 26 July 2012 accepted: 20 November 2013. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Listed Government-owned companies (LGCs) are to be found in many 
countries of the world. They are a means for national and local Govern-
ments to support the economic growth and the development of a territory or 
a sector. Their specific objectives are related to political and social dimen-
sions. However, their inherent mandates, inevitably, frequently clash with 
the economic rationale that determines profitable decision-making (Bozec 
et al., 2002). In addition to this, LGCs often constitute a particular blend of 
characteristics that are conducive to conflicting tendencies: political inter-
ests may compromise efficiency and effectiveness; directors may favour 
their own personal interests and gains (as in the private sector but with a 
political element); last but not least, Government ownership, in whole or in 
part, entails reduced risk of failure.  
Whereas the privatization process has been examined in detail (Clark 
and Pitelis, 1993; Dewenter and Malatesta, 2001) and subsequent recent 
studies have analysed performance and profitability in these companies 
(Ang and Ding, 2006; Bozec et al., 2002), as yet there has been hardly any 
investigation attempting to explore the level of disclosure in the Annual 
Reports of Government-owned companies. This is in spite of the fact that 
these companies usually manage public resources. This fact in itself is suf-
ficient to imply the need for greater accountability, more detailed infor-
mation on how public money has been spent and whether their designated 
goals have been attained (Guthrie, 1993).  
Lack of transparency has been noted, in particular, in risk reporting (Lajili 
and Zeghal, 2005) even though the withheld information would have been 
helpful to stakeholders in the assessment of going concern and company risk 
profile.  
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Furthermore, as discussed in Hodges et al. (1996), as a result of being 
owned in whole or in part by Government, LGCs usually have corporate 
governance aims and mechanisms with particular characteristics. Drawing 
from agency theory (Fama and Jensen, 1983) tension exists between princi-
pal and agent (Calabrò et al., 2013; Dharwadkar et al., 2000; Peda et al., 
2013) which can be mitigated by wider disclosure. Generally speaking, to 
create an advantageous situation for both parties, the agent should report to 
the principal what has occurred within the entity during a certain period and 
indicate possible future developments (Ijiri, 1983; Oulasvirta, 2010).  
With LGCs it is therefore important to identify which determinants may 
affect disclosure. The present study focuses on non-financial risk items 
provided by LGCs in the Management Commentary (MC). It aims to find 
out whether ownership concentration and the composition of the Board of 
Directors, together with company-specific characteristics, play a role in de-
termining the extent of risk disclosure. According to agency theory, the 
Board of Directors can be seen as an endogenously designed mechanism to 
mitigate agency problems and reduce information asymmetry, since it is the 
central decision-making arena and voluntary risk disclosure is a byproduct 
of this arena (Healy and Palepu, 2001). Therefore, since the Board of Di-
rectors of LGCs represents various interests, it is important to examine its 
structure and composition in order to test how effective it is in disclosure 
and how disclosure behaviour can be improved, and in particular to ascer-
tain how Board diversity and independent directors may help guarantee 
greater accountability on non-financial risks. In doing so it is necessary to 
take into consideration how disclosure behaviour may depend on specific 
company characteristics, as has already been pointed out with regard to pri-
vate companies (Beretta and Bozzolan, 2004; Barako et al., 2006; Eng and 
Mak, 2003; Linsley and Shrives, 2006; Ntim et al., 2013). 
The setting of the present study is the Italian Stock Exchange. At the 
end of 2010, while being relatively few in number, LGCs constituted al-
most 36% of the market capitalization of the whole Italian Stock Exchange. 
The main findings suggest that Board diversity in terms of age and gen-
der composition, leverage and sector do affect non-financial risk disclosure, 
while ownership concentration, independent directors, size and profitability 
do not. 
The present study contributes to disclosure studies in a trifold manner. 
Firstly, we focus on an under-investigated sector in response to the general 
call for more research into the public sector (Grossi and Reichard, 2008). 
Secondly, we provide evidence of governance mechanisms and inherent 
contradictions that in the public interest require improvement.  
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Thirdly, our findings reveal some useful insights concerning standard 
setters and policy makers involved in corporate disclosure.  
The paper is organized in six Sections as follows: Section 1 Introduc-
tion; Section 2 reviews previous studies and background; Section 3 devel-
ops research hypotheses; Section 4 presents the sample, data and research 
method; Section 5 tabulates and comments on empirical findings and Sec-
tion 6 offers some comments by way of conclusion. 
 
 
2. Literature review and background  
 
In discussions on the question of the governance of LGCs, agency theo-
ry has in the last few years been gaining increasing traction. Its develop-
ment has been affected by certain characteristics of the governance of 
LGCs. In LGCs the main problem concerns the identification of the princi-
pal and the agent (Peda et al., 2013). The principal may be considered to be 
the general public, citizens, service users, taxpayers and, paradoxically, al-
so the Government. The Government is considered principal because in a 
representative democracy it must represent the will of the people. Yet the 
Government as owner of the company will also, at the same time, be acting 
as the citizens’ agent. Consequently a situation develops whereby public 
interests may contrast with profitability. The tension created may have ex-
tensive consequences given that LGCs’ goals are wide-ranging and multi-
ple, encompassing economic, social and political dimensions (Bozec et al., 
2002; Xu and Wang, 1999). Furthermore, although the Governmental 
shareholder (State or Local Government) is the citizens’ agent, citizens’ in-
terests may not necessarily coincide with political ones. At this point the 
accountability paradigm, typical of the public sector, can mitigate this kind 
of dilemma. Actions ensuring greater accountability of the LGC to the citi-
zens would be ultimately advantageous to both parties. Gray et al., sum up 
the need for effective disclosure in no uncertain terms: “in a participative 
democracy there must be flows of information in which those controlling 
the resources provide accounts to society of their use of those resources. 
This is accountability” (1996: 37).  
The specialized literature on Government-owned companies considers 
accountability as strictly related to transparency. So far, disclosure has been 
considered mostly as a tool to ensure accountability (Caba Perez and 
Lopez-Hernandez, 2009) and as a matter related to Board role-diversity 
(Huse, 2005). A number of studies have pointed out that in LGCs there are 
many kinds of stakeholders (Guthrie, 1993), including Government and 
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private stakeholders, citizens and lenders. They all have an interest in being 
able to assess the company’s performance and going concern and therefore 
information on future risks and on strategies and investments to prevent, 
mitigate or avert risk-related effects. The company’s Annual Report is the 
main medium of dissemination of information to the public (Tooley and 
Guthrie, 2007; Wei et al., 2008). It is thus an important part of the account-
ability process. Our research investigates risk disclosure as it is dealt with 
in the Annual Report. 
Although determinants of disclosure in the private sector have been dis-
cussed in depth, with regard to ownership structure (Chau and Gray, 2002; 
Huafang and Jianguo, 2007) and Board composition (Beasley, 1996; Eng 
and Mak, 2003; Ho and Wong, 2001), there has been a lack of research ad-
dressing these features in the public sector. 
With LGCs the first point to consider is the particular nature of the con-
trolling shareholder. The Government as owner is expected to provide wide 
disclosure in order to mitigate agency costs and monitor any dysfunctional 
governance structure of the companies it controls. Specifically, the owner (as 
agent of the citizens) manages public resources and is supposed to demon-
strate to stakeholders how public money has been spent, which objectives 
have been achieved and what the future prospects are. In this respect, ac-
counting information (both quantitative and qualitative) can enhance ac-
countability and hence solve agency problems (Monfardini, 2010; Ryan et 
al., 2002).  
Eng and Mak (2003) have provided data showing a significant relation-
ship between Government ownership and voluntary disclosure.  
These considerations are significant when investigating corporate govern-
ance. In a number of studies the function and role of the Board of Directors 
in reporting has been thoroughly investigated (Adams et al., 2010; Denis, 
2001). Some papers focus their attention on the impact of Board composition 
on disclosure (Cheng and Courtenay, 2006; Eng and Mak, 2003; Lim et al., 
2007). However, there are very few empirical investigations into the matter 
concerning publicly owned companies (Hinna et al., 2010; Trotta et al., 
2011). Even though with the New Public Management approach manage-
ment practices have been transplanted from the private sector into the public 
sector (Conforth, 2003), considerable differences persist.  
Government-appointed Board members might have politically oriented 
goals that are unaligned with either social welfare improvements or profita-
bility (Cornett et al., 2010). At the same time, also according to agency the-
ory, directors might be tempted to pursue their own personal interests. Fur-
ther, because LGCs face a reduced risk of failure, they may feel “protected” 
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from the market and be tempted to act regardless of both public interests 
and corporate profitability.  
In this way, the Board has a key role in controlling and ensuring that its 
executives act in pursuit of the company’s goals (Conforth, 2003). It is here 
that independent Board members can play a pivotal role in determining 
changes in the company’s disclosure policies, ensuring a proper balance be-
tween different interests and improved disclosure (Ravasi and Zattoni, 
2006). As Lim et al. have ascertained “independent boards provide more 
voluntary disclosure of forward-looking information and strategic infor-
mation” (2007: 2). By analysing the role played by different legal systems 
in the relationship between corporate governance mechanisms and compa-
nies’ voluntary disclosure, Garcia-Meca and Sanchez-Ballesta (2010) re-
vealed that independent Boards are associated with higher voluntary disclo-
sure and transparency. Thus, according to agency theory, independent di-
rectors can play a vital role in monitoring management performance and 
preventing individualistic tendencies (Fama and Jensen, 1983).  
Board diversity, already widely investigated with regard to gender com-
position, age, nationality, professional experiences and education, is anoth-
er factor that can affect disclosure. Previous studies, such as that of Schip-
pers et al. (2003), indicate that Board diversity increases discussion, ex-
change of ideas and group performance. Diversity on the Board of Direc-
tors is a means of improving organizational value and performance by en-
suring that varying viewpoints are considered (Carter et al., 2003; Kang et 
al., 2007). Nevertheless, research up to now has usually focused on private 
companies, while LGCs have remained under-researched.  
Taking into account this theoretical background, our study aims to inves-
tigate whether Governmental ownership concentration and other corporate 
governance characteristics may affect voluntary disclosure, this being per-
ceived as a tool for accountability that can mitigate agency-principal prob-
lems. Perhaps more importantly, considering that companies managing pub-
lic resources have to communicate to stakeholders the risks they face, includ-
ing non-financial ones, and how they face them, (Lajili and Zéghal, 2005), 
we intend to test this relationship empirically by examining non-financial risk 
disclosure in the MC. To this end, a review of the literature on non-financial 
risk disclosure is reported below, as well as an overview of standards issued 
on risk disclosure. 
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2.1. Risk disclosure 
 
Risk disclosure is a trend of research that has attracted many scholars 
over the last decade. As Lajili and Zeghal noted (2005), studies in the field 
started by analysing financial and operational risks, and subsequently turn-
ing to strategic, regulatory and political risks.  
This kind of information has now acquired a particular relevance in the 
field of corporate disclosure. Recent corporate failures have alerted finan-
cial markets, particularly investors, to the importance of assessing certain 
sources of risks and uncertainties and of the need for better quality infor-
mation, including performance indicators, as recommended by standard set-
ters and indeed by government legislation (Dainelli and Giunta, 2011; Poti-
to, 2002; Solomon et al., 2000).  
Risk has been broadly defined as the uncertainty associated with either a 
potential gain or loss (Solomon et al., 2000). In the case of risk disclosure, 
the boundary between mandatory and voluntary is quite blurred (Lajili and 
Zéghal, 2005). Almost all the main international and national standard set-
ters recommend that any relevant information on future risks and uncertain-
ties should be disclosed in the Annual Report and, more specifically, in the 
MC. However, no strict guidelines are given about either content or form, 
which still essentially depend on the company’s attitude to disclosure and 
forward-looking information.  
According to Carlon et al. (2003: 38), all kinds of risk “affecting or po-
tentially affecting the entity’s performance and financial position” ought to 
be thoroughly disclosed in the Annual Report. 
Considering that the field of risk disclosure is remarkably wide-ranging, 
we have decided to concentrate our study on non-financial risk disclosure. 
Following the line adopted by Linsley and Shrives (2006), we have used the 
term non-financial risk to refer to the volatility of expected future earnings or 
cash flows not related to financial investments, but to “business and opera-
tional risk, regulatory risk and environmental risk, as more valuable infor-
mation about a firm’s total risk exposure” (Lajili and Zéghal, 2005: 126). 
 
 
2.2. Background 
 
Non-financial risk disclosure has to date been inadequately regulated in 
the international arena. Most of the initiatives, in fact, regard corporate dis-
closure only. Nevertheless, in the first document on the matter, Statement of 
Position 94-6, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) invited 
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American companies to disclose the nature and effects of non-financial risks 
voluntarily. This strengthens the informative content of the Management and 
Discussion Analysis as required by Registration Statement 501-07 and pro-
vides investors with “an opportunity to look at the registrant through the eyes 
of management”. The SEC requires foreign listed companies to present the 
20-F form, disclosing all information related to potential risks. 
In the United Kingdom, the Combined Code (Turnbull Report) (1999) 
has strongly recommended that companies should disclose all risks and re-
lated effects in a section of the Annual Report, the Operating and Financial 
Review, which is similar to the MC. The English standard setter, the Ac-
counting Standards Board (ASB), since 2006, has issued various standards 
that called for more transparency in risk disclosure. In 1997, the Institute of 
Chartered Accountants in England and Wales (ICAEW) suggested com-
plementing financial communications with a section “reporting on business 
risks” that should be systematically included.  
In Germany, the GAS 5 was issued in 2000. It was devoted exclusively 
to risk disclosure. Since then, German listed companies have been request-
ed to assign a specific section in the MC to exploring potential risks. More 
recently, in December 2010, the International Accounting Standards Board 
(IASB) issued the IFRS practice statement on MC. It pointed out that the 
MC is a narrative report that is an integral part of the Annual Report and 
that it “provides management with an opportunity to explain its objectives and 
its strategies for achieving those objectives”. Subsequently, in January 2013, 
the IASB included in its agenda the Disclosure Framework Project which 
aims to make disclosure more effective. Though by no means exhaustive, 
this brief overview shows how professional bodies and standard setters have 
reacted to the need to stimulate and encourage Companies to report on for-
ward-looking and risk content. 
In Italy, until 2007, there was no clear and specific regulation of non-
financial risk reporting. In 2008, legislation was passed whereby all infor-
mation related to risks, as well as future expectations, was to be disclosed 
in the MC (Maffei, 2010; Caldarelli and Fiondella, 2013).  
In fact, art. 2428 of the Italian Civil Code requires directors to provide, in 
the MC a fair, balanced and comprehensive description of the company’s situa-
tion and an illustration of the principal risks and uncertainties. The new request 
is mandatory only in its general framework, but not with respect to the content 
to be provided. In order to fill this gap, in 2007 the National Accountancy Pro-
fessional Body (CNDCEC) issued a recommendation inviting all Companies 
to provide this kind of information, identifying eleven non financial risk micro-
items (see next Section 4.2).  
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As far as international regulation is concerned, there are very few indi-
cations specifically referring to LGCs. Only the OECD has issued guide-
lines related to the Corporate Governance of Government-owned firms 
(OECD, 2005). In the paragraph concerning disclosure, it recommends that 
companies “should disclose material information […and] any material risk 
factors and measures taken to manage such risks”.  
 
 
3. Hypotheses 
 
This part of the present study investigates the effects of ownership con-
centration, Board composition and Board diversity on MC in order to de-
termine whether they influence non-financial risk disclosure in LGCs.  
Ownership concentration has already been discussed in relation to vol-
untary and mandatory disclosure as a proxy for transparency. Jensen and 
Meckling (1976) argue that large shareholders are expected to have greater 
interest in monitoring their company, because they have more wealth de-
pendent upon its performance.  
However, up to now a number of empirical investigations appear to have 
provided differing conclusions. For example, referring to risk disclosure as a 
component of voluntary disclosure, Abraham and Cox (2007) suggest that 
ownership concentration is a determinant of the quantity of risk disclosure. 
With regard to reporting on internal risk management, Deumes and Knechel 
(2008) show that Dutch-listed companies disclose less when they face fewer 
information and agency problems.  
The present study enters the largely uncharted territory of the nature of 
the controlling owner, the Government, and its impact on corporate con-
duct. Some studies (Eng and Mak, 2003; Tooley et al., 2010) confirm that 
concentrated Government-owned companies communicate a wide range of 
information on their performance.  
On the other hand, observing a sample of Chinese listed firms, Huafang 
and Yuan (2007) reveal that Government-ownership concentration is not 
associated with increased voluntary disclosure, and Jalila (2012) also finds no 
link. Based on these arguments, in order to reduce agency problems and in ac-
cordance with the accountability paradigm, we suggest that the Government 
blockholder, acting as the citizens’ agent, represents an additional monitor that 
might encourage directors to provide more risk information. Hence, the first 
hypothesis to be tested is:  
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H1) Increased Government-ownership concentration has a positive ef-
fect on non-financial risk disclosure in the MC of LGCs. 
Agency theory studies reveal how Board characteristics regarding com-
position, diversity and expertise affect the ability of the Board and how it 
carries out its duties (Hinna et al., 2010). In particular, Board composition 
and Board diversity have been extensively explored in the literature related 
to private-owned companies as a tool to affect disclosure in order to miti-
gate agency problems and help ensure transparency. Up to now, in this re-
spect, LGCs have been under-researched (Hinna et al., 2010).  
Results of empirical investigations into the effects of Board independ-
ence on voluntary disclosure have revealed some contradictions. Beasley 
(1996) provided evidence that the proportion of independent members is 
positively related to the Board’s ability to improve disclosure.  
Recent studies confirm this positive correlation in countries such as New 
Zealand and Zimbabwe (Adams and Hossain, 1998; Felo et al., 2009; 
Mangena and Tauringana, 2007).  
By contrast, other papers focusing on Malaysia, Singapore and Kenya, 
find a negative relationship (Barako et al., 2006; Eng and Mak, 2003; Han-
nifa and Cooke, 2005). Another set of studies shows insignificant links be-
tween voluntary disclosure and Board independence in Hong Kong (Ho and 
Wong, 2001) and in the UK markets (Brammer and Pavelin, 2006). Refer-
ring to risk disclosure, Abraham and Cox (2007) reveal positive influence 
from independent members. With all this in mind, our second hypothesis to 
be tested is: 
H2) Having a greater proportion of independent members on the Board 
has a positive effect on non-financial risk disclosure in the MC of LGCs. 
Board diversity has been studied in terms of gender composition, age, 
nationality, professional experiences and functional education. In recent 
years there has been greater awareness of the importance of gender compo-
sition. Traditionally, however, the application of agency theory has not 
provided insights into whether gender composition, in particular greater 
female representation, can improve the Board’s effectiveness.  
While it is assumed that gender can explain differences in behaviour and 
skills (consider, for instance, gender-related differences in leadership theo-
ries) (Yukl, 2002), studies on the subject have provided mixed results. For 
example some studies on Norwegian Companies highlight that women di-
rectors influence the Board positively through their contribution to deci-
sion-making and effectiveness (Gul et al., 2011; Nielsen and Huse, 2010). 
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In contrast to this, Burke (2000) has questioned whether the presence of 
more women would necessarily contribute significantly to the Board’s per-
formance. These studies on the subject have mainly focused on the private 
sector.  
In Italy, a recent survey conducted by Bianco et al. (2011) shows that, at 
the end of 2010, the relationship between women directors and good gov-
ernance proxies seems to be negative. Listed companies with at least one 
woman have a lower Board attendance and a lower number of Board meet-
ings than listed companies without women. Nevertheless, our third hypoth-
esis for verification is:  
H3) Having a greater number of women on the Board positively affects 
non-financial risk disclosure in the MC of LGCs. 
Still on the subject of Board diversity, there is as yet very little empirical 
evidence on the effect of the age of Board members and it is mostly unre-
lated to disclosure practices. However, age may be considered one of the 
background diversity issues to be observed, as it may offer broader per-
spective in the decision-making process. Core et al. (1999), focusing on 
Board remuneration, found, perhaps surprisingly, that CEO remuneration is 
inversely proportional to age. In a similarly way, Kang et al. (2007) found 
that the age of directors in the top 100 Australian companies is a significant 
element of diversity that should be taken into consideration.  
Considering the paucity of studies on the relationship between the age 
of directors and non-financial risk disclosure and assuming that older 
members have maturity and experience that could favourably affect corpo-
rate conduct, we have formulated our fourth hypothesis as follows:  
H4) A greater number of older members on the Board positively affects 
non-financial risk disclosure in the MC of LGCs. 
Finally, in order to isolate the effect of the above-mentioned determi-
nants from that of others, a number of control variables has been included, 
as was the case in previous studies discussing determinants of risk disclo-
sure (e.g., Beretta and Bozzolan, 2004; Barako et al., 2006; Eng and Mak, 
2003; Linsley and Shrives, 2006).  
In the present study company size, sector, leverage and profitability 
have been included as control variables to identify company-specific char-
acteristics. 
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4. Sample and method 
 
The research conducted in the present study analyses non-financial risk 
disclosure in the narrative section of the MC of the Annual Reports of Ital-
ian LGCs over a three-year period from 2008 to 2010. The commencement 
of our sample period in 2008 was chosen to coincide with the introduction 
and application of the new Italian legislation on risk disclosure in the MC.  
We end our analysis in 2010 with conclusions based on the data availa-
ble at the time.  
The sample observed in this study consists entirely of Italian LGCs 
listed on the Italian Stock Exchange (ISE). Newly listed, delisted and bank-
rupt companies are not included. A total of 17 companies were checked 
once a year for three years. Although relatively few in number, LGCs in 
2010 represented almost 36% of the total market capitalization of the entire 
Italian Stock Exchange. The present study encompasses LGCs where the 
Government either: 1) owns over 50% of the share equity or 2) owns less 
than 50% of share equity but is entitled to appoint of the majority of direc-
tors and consequently prevails in voting at general meetings.  
Quantitative and qualitative independent variables for each year were 
collected through company web sites and Datastream database.  
To test our hypotheses, the study was carried out in two stages as fol-
lows.  
First, manual content analysis was conducted on all Italian LGCs’ annu-
al MCs, to determine their disclosure level by using an information index.  
Secondly, the association between the independent variables and the in-
formation index was tested by applying the Poisson regression model. 
 
 
4.1. Independent variables 
 
Ownership concentration. Empirical studies have used various criteria to 
examine the relationship between disclosure and ownership concentration. 
Papers have focussed on the percentage of the company owned either by the 
largest, or the largest two, or all the main shareholders (e.g. Lim et al., 2007; 
Mangena and Tauringana, 2007; Patelli and Prencipe, 2007). The present 
study measures Government-ownership concentration as the total percentage 
of shares held.  
Board Independence. There is no general consensus on how the concept 
of Board independence should be defined. The most common proxy for 
measuring independence in relation to disclosure is the number of non-
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executive and independent directors in relation to the size of the Board 
(Adams and Hossain, 1998; Barako et al., 2006; Lim et al., 2007).  
We use this proxy in line with Menozzi et al. (2010). For the definition 
of independence we refer to the Italian legislation for listed companies 
(Legislative Decree no. 58/1998) and use the concept of independence as 
outlined in article 148 of the Italian regulation (T.U.F.), which excludes di-
rectors with kinship, professional, employee or economic relationships with 
the company. Thus, in the present study the proxy for Board independence 
is the number of independent directors at the end of each period examined 
in relation to the size of the Board.  
Board diversity. We evaluate Board diversity by two different proxies: 
gender diversity and age diversity. Previous studies have usually assessed 
gender diversity by counting male and female directors on the Board (e.g., 
Kang et al., 2007; Nielsen and Huse, 2010). Here, the proxy for gender di-
versity is the proportion of the number of women directors at the end of 
each period examined in relation to the size of the Board.  
Kang et al. (2007) considered the age of 50 as the age threshold for di-
rectors, while Core et al. (1999), focusing on the relationship between re-
muneration and Board composition, considered 69 as the age threshold for 
directors. Taking 65 to be the normal retirement age, we adopted 65 as the 
age threshold for directors. In the present study the proxy for age diversity 
is the proportion of directors over the age of 65, at the end of each period ex-
amined, in relation to the size of the Board.  
Control variables. Lastly, in line with previous studies on disclosure 
(Beretta and Bozzolan, 2004; Barako et al., 2006; Linsley and Shrives, 2006; 
Ntim et al., 2013) we have also adopted the following as control variables: size 
(total assets at the end of each period), sector (1 if the company is Utility, oth-
erwise zero) leverage (debt/ equity ratio) and profitability (ROE, i.e. Return on 
Equity ratio). 
 
 
4.2. Dependent variable  
 
A considerable amount of research has already been carried out on con-
tent analysis for risk disclosure (Beattie et al., 2004; Beretta and Bozzolan, 
2004; Lajili and Zeghal, 2005; O’ Sullivan et al., 2008). However, the 
manual content analysis in the present study focuses exclusively on various 
non-financial risk issues as identified in the 2008 guidelines provided by 
the CNDCEC.  
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Distinct risk categories have already been identified. For example Linsley 
and Shrives (2006) adopted a framework consisting of 37 sub-risk categories, 
while Papa (2007) used 75 specific risk categories. The Italian guidelines list 
11 macro-items of non-financial risk disclosure (process, commitment, hu-
man resources, ethics, informativeness, dependence, market, regulation, natu-
ral disaster, competition, scenario). For each of them, it provides sub-
classifications concerning information on strategies (four items: prevention, 
transfer, face risk and elimination) adopted by companies to deal with risks; 
information on expected investments (two items: qualitative and quantitative 
data); and information on expected effects related to risks (two items: qualita-
tive and quantitative data) making a total of 88 items. 
In line with previous studies (Abu Bakar and Saleh, 2011), to determine 
the dependent variable we have adopted the risk items related to non-
financial risk disclosure as defined by Italian guidelines, and used a dichoto-
mous binary method of scoring in which all items are given equal weight. 
Thus, for each LGC the total disclosure score (TDS) is expressed as follows:  
 
TDS = Σ fi 
where TDS is the total disclosure score (minimum value = 0; maximum 
value = 88) for each company; f = 1 (YES) if the risk item fi is disclosed, 
and f = 0 (NO) if the risk item fi is not disclosed.  
 
 
4.3. The method 
 
The Poisson regression (log-linear model) is applied in this study since 
the dependent variable counts the number of realizations (Agresti, 2007). 
The model belongs to the family of generalized linear models (McCullagh 
and Nelder, 1989; Wacholder, 1986) in which the link function is the loga-
rithm and the response variable follows a Poisson distribution. The model 
adopted is: 
 
Pr))(log( 876543210 βββββββββ ++++++++= LEVSECSIZEAGEWINDSHTDSE
 
where: 
TDS = total disclosure index  
SH = % of shares held by the Governmental owner 
IND = ratio of independent directors 
W = ratio of women directors 
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AGE = ratio of old directors 
SIZE= total assets 
SEC = sector (assuming 1 for utility, 0 otherwise) 
LEV = debt to equity ratio 
Pr = return on equity ratio (ROE) 
 
 
5. Results 
 
Table 1 is an overview of our sample during the three year period of ob-
servation. 
 
Table 1 – Overall sample description – Mean value of three years 2008-2010 
Company 
name 
Sector 
1=utilities 
0=others 
No of 
employees Board size Sales 
Return on 
investments 
A2A 1 1,654 15 775,333 0.017 
Acea 1 525 12 1,201,933 -0.015 
Acegas 1 1,387 13 404,926 0.038 
Acque potabili 1 216 9 56,234 0.007 
Acsm 1 237 10 138,206 -0.005 
Ansaldo Sts 0 1,510 9 1,059,053 0.048 
Ascopiave 1 227 5 68,811 0.047 
Centrale Latte Torino 0 156 10 58,762 0.051 
Enel S.p.a. 1 735 9 692,920 0.003 
Eni 1 12,448 10 38,466,291 0.016 
Fiera di Milano 0 370 9 173,961 0.041 
Finmeccanica 0 302 12 74,124 -0.006 
Hera 1 3,990 18 1,137,071 0.027 
Iride 1 139 13 6,506 -0.005 
Saipem 0 18,120 9 4,238,914 0.080 
Snam Rete Gas 1 3,539 9 2,605,000 0.074 
Terna 1 3,499 9 1,316,809 0.071 
total sample  
70.58%  
utilities 2,885 11 3,086,756 0.030 
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Table 2 shows descriptive statistics related both to the total disclosure 
index (TDS) and to all variables during the three year observation window 
(no. 51 total observations). 
 
Table 2 – Descriptive statistic 
Variables Mean  Median Min Max St dev 
TDS 12 12 1 24 5 
SH 50 51 30 75 13 
IND 54 56 7 100 25 
W 4 0 0 22 6 
AGE 24 22 0 77 21 
SIZE 5,266,149 645,000 4,399 74,383,927 16,172,361 
LEV 59 60 21 83 13 
Pr 15 6 -9 33 47 
 
The overall TDS mean score (as well as the median score) of 12 risk 
items (out of a possible 88) suggests a low level of risk disclosure in the 
MC of LGCs. The table also displays that there is a large variation among 
companies, with a minimum of 1 and a maximum of 24 risk items dis-
closed. The mean (50 percent) and median (51 percent) of Government-
ownership concentration are relatively high, exhibiting a predominantly 
public ownership concentration. The minimum percentage concentration 
was found to be 30% while the maximum was 75%. The mean of inde-
pendent directors is relatively high at 54 percent, although there is a wide 
range of variation (from a minimum 7% up to 100%). However, in Board 
diversity, we observe a very low (almost absent) presence of women Board 
members, as the mean is close to 4%. Furthermore, the range is both low 
and narrow varying from a minimum of 0% to a maximum of 22%. The 
mean presence of members older than 65 years is 24% ranging from a min-
imum of 0% to a maximum of 77%.  
For size the overall mean of total assets is € 5,266,149 (while the medi-
an is € 645,000) as is consistent with the coexistence of both very big and 
small sized companies. Leverage is high. Both the mean and the median are 
almost 60 percent. The range of leverage is from 21% to 83%. Lastly, prof-
itability (measured as ROE) ranges from -9% to 33% with a mean of 15%.  
The mean risk categorisations of TDS during the three-year observation pe-
riod is detailed in Table 3. 
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Table 3 – Distribution of TDS – Mean value of three years 2008-2010 
Non-financial  
risk items Strategies  Expected Investments  Expected Effects  
Process 56 12 7 
Commitment 7 4 0 
Human Resources 14 7 3 
Ethics 11 9 1 
Informativeness  12 7 1 
Dependence 10 5 5 
Market 23 12 4 
Regulation 16 8 4 
Natural disaster 5 3 0 
Competition 3 2 1 
Scenario 8 5 1 
 
The highest scores: process (56), market (23), regulation (16) and hu-
man resources (14) suggest that Italian LGCs tend to focus their non-
financial risk disclosure strategies in these areas. By contrast, LGCs appear 
to give very little attention to the disclosure of “expected investments” and 
“expected effects”. For the former, the highest scores are for process (12) 
and market (12) while for the latter the highest scores are for process (7) 
and dependence (5).  
Looking at the table as a whole it is striking and disturbing that, the two 
items with zero disclosures to be found under the heading “expected ef-
fects” are: commitment and natural disaster. 
The complete findings of the Poisson regression are displayed in Table 4. 
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Table 4 – Regression model 
Variables Coefficient p-value 
SH -0.000    0.856 
IND 0.108 0.608   
W -2.034      0.010*** 
AGE 0.497    0.024** 
Control variables   
SIZE -0.000 0.717 
SEC (utility) -0.377     0.001*** 
LEV 0.960      0.010***  
Pr -0.002 0.982 
Intercept 2.096 0.000 
Omnibus test 0.000 
Log Likelihood: -140.786; LRchi2: 59.45 
***Significant at 1%; ** Significant at 5%  
***Significant at 1%; ** Significant at 5%  
 
Since the model indicates that some variables are not statistically signif-
icant, we have gone backwards dropping the non significant explanatory 
variables one by one and forwards again (adding one by one the explanato-
ry variables) procedures of selection. Table 5 displays these findings, con-
firming that the model is correctly specified, provides significant results 
and is able to identify and explain a number of determinants affecting risk 
disclosure. 
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Table 5 – Regression model – Backward and Forward procedures of selection 
Backward  procedure 
1) p = 0.982 >= 0.050  removing Pr; 2) p = 0.854 >= 0.050  removing SH;  
3) p = 0.748 >= 0.050  removing SIZE; 4) p = 0.592 >= 0.050  removing IND 
 
Variables Coefficient p-value 
W -2.042 0.009*** 
AGE 0.546 0.005*** 
SEC (utility) -0.380 0.000*** 
LEV 1.043 0.003*** 
Intercept 2.054 0.000 
Omnibus test 0.000 
Log Likelihood: -140.999; LRchi2: 59.02 
***Significant at 1%; ** Significant at 5%  
***Significant at 1%; ** Significant at 5%  
Forward  procedure 
1) p = 0.000 <  0.050  adding  SEC; 2) p = 0.000 <  0.050  adding  W;  
3) p = 0.005 <  0.050  adding  LEV; 4) p = 0.005 <  0.050  adding  AGE 
Variables Coefficient p-value 
W -2.042 0.000*** 
AGE 0.546 0.005*** 
SEC (utility) -0.380 0.000*** 
LEV 1.043 0.003*** 
Intercept 2.054   0.000 
Omnibus test   0.000 
Log Likelihood: -140.999; LRchi2: 59.02 
***Significant at 1%; ** Significant at 5%  
 
For each of the hypotheses formulated in Section 3, the conclusions 
drawn are shown below.  
Confirming the findings of Huafang and Yuan (2007), our results show 
that since the coefficient is not statistically significant, on the whole, Gov-
ernmental presence as shareholder does not affect risk disclosure.  
Our findings on Board composition differ from those of previous studies 
(Chen and Jaggi, 2000; Garcia-Meca and Sanchez-Ballesta, 2010; Huafang 
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and Jianguo, 2007; Ntim et al., 2013; Patelli and Prencipe, 2007); The sec-
ond hypothesis is refuted because the number of independent directors on 
the Board is not shown to be related to non-financial risk disclosure.  
In regards to Board diversity our findings are perhaps counter-intuitive. 
In contrast with the findings of most other analyses (e.g. Gul et al., 2011), 
our results indicate that women directors have a negative influence on dis-
closure practices. In particular, confirming prior empirical findings in Italy 
(Bianco et al., 2011), the presence of women on the Boards of LGCs actu-
ally decreases the level of non-financial risk disclosure. The coefficient is -
2.042 with a p-value of 1 percent. A possible explanation could be that the 
female presence is still limited to a minority of Companies, as corporate 
governance in Italy is predominantly male-oriented. When women sit on 
Boards, in most cases they are alone and possibly not keen on influencing 
the conduct of the other (male) Board members. Moreover, according to 
Nielsen and Huse (2010), the perception of women directors as non-equal, to-
ken members, may actually decrease the potential for women to influence 
Board decision-making. This result contributes to the literature questioning 
women’s ability to contribute to Board activities when the context is predomi-
nantly male-value-oriented (Burke, 2000; Schein, 1973).  
The research reveals that the greater the presence of old directors, the 
greater the disclosure of non-financial risk items, hence greater accounta-
bility. Thus our hypothesis is confirmed. The coefficient associated with 
age diversity is 0.546, at 1 percent level of significance (p-value = 0.005). 
In line with a prior study (Kang et al., 2007), this result suggests that, on 
average, age diversity should be considered a positive element in improving 
corporate conduct and Board decision making in Italian LGCs. Possibly the 
experience of older directors may be looked upon as being more conducive 
to responsible conduct than the new ideas from younger directors. The find-
ings that there are very few women on Boards and that there is preference 
for older (experienced) male directors may reflect features that are specific 
to the Italian situation. 
Considering the control variables, our results indicate that only sector 
and leverage are related to greater risk disclosure. For sector, in contrast to 
previous contributions (e.g. Abraham and Cox, 2007), we find a negative 
coefficient of -0.380 with a p-value of 1 percent. This suggests that general-
ly Italian listed government utility companies are particularly reticent when 
disclosing risk information. On the other hand, where leverage is con-
cerned, there is a positive coefficient of 1.043 with a p-value of 1 percent. 
In line with studies in the private sector (e.g. Barako et al., 2006; Deumes 
and Knechel, 2008) our findings confirm that highly leveraged LGCs in-
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crease their level of risk disclosure, thus reducing monitoring costs and en-
hancing the accountability paradigm.  
Lastly, consistent with previous findings, the present study shows that in 
the Italian context, the size and profitability of LGCs are not significant de-
terminants of risk disclosure (Beretta and Bozzolan, 2004; Elshandidy et 
al., 2013). 
 
 
6. Concluding reflections 
 
In the present study the impact of corporate governance mechanisms 
and company-specific characteristics on non-financial risk disclosure has 
been tested in Italian LGCs.  
The main findings suggest, in particular, that Board diversity in terms of 
age and gender composition, leverage and sector affect this type of disclo-
sure. Quantitative and qualitative information is conducive to accountabil-
ity. This paper fulfils a need for more studies on governance mechanisms in 
the public domain (Grossi and Reichard, 2008) and offers conclusions of 
interest to both standard setters and policy-makers.  
Indeed, it adds to recent studies on disclosure by analysing specific aspects 
of non-financial risk disclosure in Italy, which hitherto have been patchy and 
mainly anecdotal or descriptive. It provides an empirical rationale for the cur-
rent debate on improving narrative reporting of Italian LGCs.  
Efforts need to be made to induce LGCs to release more detailed infor-
mation on planned investment and how they propose to manage non-
financial risks and related effects. Such information, of course, is essential 
both for shareholders and citizens who have a right to know how a Gov-
ernment-owned company is coping with markets, competitors, threats and 
opportunities and, above all, how it is employing public resources. 
Guidelines to enhance accountability for both listed and non-listed Gov-
ernment-owned companies are therefore desirable (Ryan, 2012).  
The findings of the present study also suggest that corporate governance 
could be made more effective if Board diversity in terms of age and gender 
are reconsidered. 
However, the present research has some inherent limitations. 
Our disclosure index only investigates the presence of non-financial risk 
disclosure items provided in the MC. It does not assign any value to the 
quality of those items, since any scale of values would be considered sub-
jective. However, the addressees of corporate narrative reporting also have 
Riccardo Macchioni, Alessandra Allini, Francesca Manes Rossi 
26 
interest in the quality of disclosure which is beyond the scope of the present 
study.  
Our contribute has focussed specifically on the Italian context. As al-
ready explored in literature, a country’s legal origin derives from a long and 
stratified process that might influence the relation between corporate gov-
ernance characteristics and voluntary disclosure policies by firms (La Porta 
et al., 1998). Accordingly, a broader, transnational analysis would also be 
of interest.  
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